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Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race:
The Legality and Desirability of Bush's National Space
Policy under the Public and Customary International
Laws of Space
Jacob M. Harper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the War on Terror has
affected US defense policy in lands as far flung as Afghanistan, Southeast Asia,
and Iraq. Recently, President George W. Bush has expanded the scope of the
War on Terror into a new area: space. On August 31, 2006, President Bush
authorized the new National Space Policy ("NSP06"), an assertion of the US's
right to defend itself in outer space. In it, the US reserves the right to "deny, if
necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to [US] interests."1 It
also declares that "[p]roposed arms control agreements must not impair the
rights of the [US] to conduct... activities in space for [US] national interests."2
The NSP06 thus grants the US wide unilateral discretion to protect its national
interests in space.
Predictably, the international response has not been enthusiastic. A
London Times editorial piece summed up the consensus view on the NSP06:
"SPACE: no longer the final frontier but the [fifty-first] state of the United
States."3 Russia claims that the US "want[s] to dictate to others who else is
* BA, 2005, University of California, Los Angeles; JD Candidate 2008, The University of Chicago.
The author would like to thank the CJIL staff, his family, and Suny Kun for their support.
I Presidential Directive 49, National Space Poliy, Principles 5 (2006), available online at
<http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%/20National/20Space%20Policy.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
("NSP06").
2 Id.
3 Bronwen Maddox, Ameica Wants it All--Life, the Universe, and Eveything, London Times Online
(Oct 19, 2006), available online at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/
bronwen-maddox/article605583.ece> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (arguing that the NSP06 stands
among many US efforts to exert its influence universally).
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allowed to go there" and has called the NSP06 "the first step toward a serious
deepening of the military confrontation in space."4 Meanwhile, China recently
launched its first antisatellite missile in January 2007 in an apparent response to
the US's increasingly assertive position in space.5 The US's aggressive assertion
of space rights through the NSP06 has spurred strong responses from China and
Russia, the primary rivals of the US for space power. The NSP06 may be
unpopular, but is it illegal?
This Development argues that it is not. Although a backdrop of
international treaties requires peaceful, nonmilitary use of outer space and the
moon, these treaties do not bar space regulation as proposed by the NSP06. In
addition, customary international law of space also suggests that the NSP06 is
legal. Section II grounds the NSP06 in the historical context of space
competition from the Cold War to the War on Terror, as well as in general
national security policy since the September 11th attacks. It further argues that
the current space treaty regime does not invalidate the NSP06. Section III
analyzes the customary international law of space and posits that it also would
not conflict with the NSP06. Section IV concludes by investigating implications
of the NSP06's legality in light of current international politics.
II. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY UNDER THE MOON AND OUTER
SPACE TREATIES
A. COLD WAR TENSIONS LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT OF
CURRENT SPACE LAW REGIME
Space policy-related tensions arise from two main factors: development of
technology capable of expanding countries' power in space and underlying
political tensions between countries holding that technology. Today, that
technology involves satellite surveillance and ballistic missile defenses of
countries vying for power in the midst of the war on terror. Current space
treaties, however, developed during another era of blossoming technology and
political tensions: the Cold War.
As early as the 1950s, the US and USSR engaged in a struggle for space
dominance.6 Both countries feared that, because each possessed nuclear
4 Report. Russian Official Shapyl CnticZes Assertive New U.S. Space Policy, Intl Herald Trib (Nov 29,
2006), available online at <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/29/europe/EUGEN
Russia USSpace.php> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
5 See William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test, NY Times
Al (Jan 18, 2007).
6 See Nina Tannenwald, Law versus Power on the High Frontier The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer
Space, 29 Yale J Intl L 363, 373 (2004). See also Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A
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weapons, the other would combine its space-based technical expertise with
nuclear knowledge to obliterate the other. Nonetheless, both powers viewed
space technology as critical to both their civilian and non-nuclear military
futures.8 International consensus developed that the powers should use space for
nonaggressive purposes. 9
The consensus was codified in five space treaties that, since 1967, have
provided the general principles defining positive international law governing
space generally. ° Two of these-the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty-
articulate three main principles governing space use specifically. First, "[o]uter
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means."" Second, the "moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
states Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes."' 2 Third, "any
threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon [or other celestial
bodies] is prohibited."' 3
Despite the efforts to define an international law of space, critics have
complained that the governing space treaties serve little use because of their
"very general" language. 4 For example, both treaties require that outer space be
reserved for "peaceful" purposes, but neither the treaty nor international legal
norms define the word. Thus, it is unclear whether the treaties allow for satellite-
based military surveillance of other countries. It is also unclear what constitutes
"national appropriation." If the US invoked the NSP06 to prevent a foreign
Political History of the Space Age 41-42 (Basic 1985) (discussing early military concerns at the
beginning of the space age).
7 See W. Michael Reisman, Internalional Law After the Cold War, 84 Am J Intl L 859, 859-860 (1990)
(noting that political scientists call the bilateral threat of nuclear annihilation the "Mutually
Assured Destruction" theory).
8 See Tannenwald, 29 Yale J Intl L at 372-73 (cited in note 6).
9 Id.
10 Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, General Assembly
Res No 34/68, UN Doc A/34/664 (1979) ("Moon Treaty"); Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), 28 UST 695; Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), 24 UST 2389; Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(1968), 19 UST 7570; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), 18 UST 2410
("Outer Space Treaty').
11 Outer Space Treaty, art II (cited in note 10).
12 Id, art IV, 2.
13 Moon Treaty, art III, 2 (cited in note 10). See id, art I, 1 ("The provisions of this Agreement
shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth.").
14 See, for example, Tannenwald, 29 Yale J Intl L at 370 (cited in note 6).
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country's vehicles from coming within a mile of US military satellites, such an
action arguably constitutes a "national appropriation" in violation of the treaty.
Finally, the definition of "outer space" itself remains vague-while outer space
includes the moon and "other celestial bodies,""5 it is not clear what else, if
anything, outer space encompasses. Perhaps the ambiguities of positive
international law of space explain why the treaties contain the caveat that the
treaty be applied consistent with customary "international law."' 6 Where the
treaties fail to provide clear answers, customary international law norms fill the
treaties' gaps.
Despite their shortcomings, the space treaties carried the superpowers
through the Cold War with no space-based military conflicts. Proxy wars
occurred in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but the space between the moon and
Earth remained conflict free. Peace was probably not so much a result of the
treaties' collective language, which remained difficult to interpret, as the
continuing spirit of cooperation that guided the concomitant decline of the Cold
War during the 1970s and 1980s.
B. SPACE POLICY BEFORE THE WAR ON TERROR
Every president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has crafted statements of
policy declaring how to execute space law and policy.' 7 Space policies generally
have paralleled the goals of the space treaties: reservation of space for peaceful
purposes, prohibitions on sovereignty over celestial bodies, and free travel of
spacecraft. 8 They sometimes elaborate on other space policy goals, but they
generally have not conflicted with the broad and ambiguous provisions of the
space treaties.' 9
President Bill Clinton's National Space Policy of 1996 ("NSP96"), which
remained in effect until Bush's 2006 revision, is an example of US policy
reaffirming the broad policies of the space treaties.2 ° Like the Moon and Outer
Space Treaties, the NSP96 rejects "any claims to sovereignty by any nation over
15 See generally Moon Treaty (cited in note 10).
16 Moon Treaty, art 2 (cited in note 10).
17 Jeff Foust, Whither Presidenlial Space Poliy?, Space Rev (May 22, 2006), available online at
<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/627/1> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
18 Id.
19 For a list of these documents, see Key Documents in the History of Space Policy, available online
at <http://history.nasa.gov/spdocs.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (citing several important
documents regarding US national space policy).
20 Presidential Directive 49, National Space Poly, 3 (1996), available online at
<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/nstc-8.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
('NSP96'".
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outer space or celestial bodies"'2' and views "as an infringement on sovereign
rights" the "purposeful interference with space systems.22  The NSP96,
however, generally fails to resolve the space treaties' ambiguities. For example,
NSP96 refers to "peaceful purposes" without defining the term. It also fails to
outline enforcement mechanisms. Overall, the NSP96, like its predecessor NSPs,
reaffirmed the space treaties but did little to clarify them. Terms remained ill-
defined while an enforcement mechanism remained elusive.
Nonetheless, the space-based threats from other countries remained
minimal during the 1990s. In contrast to the period leading up to the
development of the Moon Treaty, no significant political threats from other
space powers threatened to disrupt the 1990s extraterrestrial equilibrium. Thus,
it did not matter whether the space treaties or NSPs were easy to interpret or to
enforce because the political situation suggested that enforcement was
unnecessary.
At the same time, space technology was beginning to render the space
treaties obsolete. By 1996, satellites had become increasingly essential to the US
economy and military, but the space treaties provided no explicit protections for
them.23 If a space power became a political threat and shot down a US satellite,
the space treaties offered-and continue to offer-no recourse. The US would
have to look to customary international law to protect its satellites. Not viewing
the lack of legal protection over satellites as a credible political threat, the US
and other actors apparently saw no need to redraft or to interpret existing
international law to account for unlikely threats to rapidly improving space
technology.
Ultimately, existing space law failed to keep pace with developing
technologies by the 1990s. However, political parity among the world's space
powers rendered the obsolescence unimportant. None viewed space-based
military threats as viable; the space treaties, therefore, remained ambiguous and
largely unenforceable, and the NSP96 did nothing to clarify them.
21 Id. The reference to "outer space or celestial bodies" of NSP96 distinguishes "outer space" from
"celestial bodies." By contrast, the Space Treaty ambiguously defines "outer space" as "including
the moon and celestial bodies." The ambiguity is important because it is not clear whether the
Space Treaty protects against areas surrounding celestial bodies, or pertains to celestial bodies
themselves.
22 NSP96, Introduction 1 (cited in note 20).
23 Id at 372 (noting that satellites do not qualify as a "celestial body").
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C. THE NSP06 DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE SPACE TREATIES
1. Technology and Politics Render the Space Treaties Obsolete
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, circumstances have changed along both
technological and political dimensions to make alterations in space law
inevitable. Space technology has rapidly improved while the world economy and
many countries' militaries increasingly depend on it. Satellite technology now
links phone calls together for cellular phone networks, identifies travel positions
for GPS, and powers improving cable television technology. As a result, civilian
cellular telephone networks, mapping systems, television, and internet service
increasingly rely on satellite communications. Military weapons and
communications systems depend on them to an even greater degree.24
Politically, the US has declared its War on Terror and waged it against
amorphous sets of enemies around the world, most notably terrorist groups in
Iraq and Afghanistan. While neither of these countries possesses sufficient space
power to threaten US space interests, specific threats to US space interests come
from two main sources: terrorist groups in the short term and other countries in
the long term. In the short term, the US fears that terrorist groups will acquire
weapons that can hijack US space targets, including satellites.25 In the longer
term stand fears that countries such as China or Russia may emerge as political
competitors and threats to peace in space.26
Many criticize NSP06 as prompting a new space-based arms race, but
perhaps it merely addresses the failings of the now-obsolete Moon and Outer
Space Treaties. Changes along the technological and political dimensions have
brought uncertainty to the international space law regime similar to those last
seen in the 1960s, during the development of the current Space Treaty system.
Just as technological and political novelties of the 1960s rendered existing law of
the pre-space age insufficient to address the new threats of the Cold War and
Space Race, the War on Terror and the modern economy's growing reliance on
new space technologies have similarly rendered the space treaties insufficient to
ensure security in space today.
24 See Richard A. Morgan, Militagy Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer
Space Treao and 'Peaceful Purposes," 60 J Air L & Comm 237, 248 (1994) ("Military use of outer
space is fundamental to US national security.").
25 John F. Murphy, Brave New World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crime-An Overview, 50
ViUl L Rev 375, 383 (2005). See also Noah Shachtman, The Satellite Hackers, Popular Mechanics
Mag 24 (Feb 2007) (noting US military's concern about vulnerability of satellites to terrorist
attacks).
26 China's secret launch of antisatellite missile tests in January 2007 underscores the reality of this
threat. See Broad and Sanger, Flexing Muscle, NY Times at Al (cited in note 5).
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2. The NSP06 Does Not Violate the Space Treaties
Unlike the NSP96, the NSP06 arguably fills the gaps left by existing space
law. The NSP06 affirmatively "den[ies] .. . adversaries the use of space
capabilities hostile to [ ] national interests, ' 27 thereby establishing the effective
power to enjoin competitors from space. The NSP96, the Moon Treaty, and the
Outer Space Treaty, in contrast, all failed to articulate such a means for
enforcing the requirement of "peaceful" uses. The political parity that
characterized adoption of the Moon and Outer Space Treaties, and continued
when the NSP96 was drafted, probably guaranteed peace; the space treaties
themselves likely did nothing. In reserving power to "deny" adverse uses of
space, the US has asserted itself as the enforcement mechanism that current
space law sorely lacks.
Additionally, in denying adversaries the use of space capabilities, the
NSP06 is consistent with, though not contemplated by, the Moon and Outer
Space Treaties. The provision most at odds with the NSP06's right to deny
adversaries the use of space is the Outer Space Treaty's declaration that "[ojuter
space . . .is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means. 28 On the one hand, the
US's unilateral prevention of another's use of space seems to constitute
"appropriation." If appropriation is the taking possession of property, and
property arises through the power to exclude others, then the NSP06 would
contradict the treaty. On the other hand, the US limits denial of use to
"adversaries" only; it does not reserve the right to exclude all others, as
"appropriation" implies. Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty qualifies
"appropriation" with "by claim of sovereignty" and "by means of use or
occupation" 9 -both of which imply exclusion in the broad sense of
colonization, not the narrower sense of protecting national interests. Thus, even
the provision most at odds with the NSP06 does not render NSP06 unlawful.
Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty's "international consultations"
provision has only an illusory conflict with the NSP06. The provision provides
that states must engage in "international consultations" where it "has reason to
believe that an activity.., would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space.'  If the US were unilaterally to deny another country's hostile use of
space, it arguably would violate this provision. Nonetheless, the language again
27 NSP06, art II, 5 (cited in note 1).
28 Outer Space Treaty, art II (cited in note 10).
29 Id.
30 Id, art IX.
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depends on nondescript notions of "peace. ' 31 If the US finds that another
adversary uses space in a manner "hostile to national interests," then acts,
without international consultation, to stop that adversary's use of space, it is not
clear that the treaty would prohibit that denial. 2 The Outer Space Treaty's vague
language thus does not contradict the US's ability to stop adversaries from using
space in a hostile manner.
In addition, the Moon and Outer Space Treaties say very little because of
the ambiguities and platitudes that pervade them. They fail to control spacefarer
behavior because their language prohibits very little. From a practical standpoint,
technological and political changes in the forty years preceding NSP06 have
rendered the earlier space treaties obsolete. Applying the Cold War-era Moon
and Outer Space Treaties to the modern era of satellites and the War on Terror
is like imposing regulations governing Civil War cannons on nuclear weapons.
III. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SPACE
The NSP06 does not contradict the Moon and Outer Space Treaties;
underlying the treaty regime, however, may rest a customary international law of
space to govern space relations in the absence of positive law. If so, then the
NSP06's legality would depend on consistency with customary international law
as well. The possible presence of a customary international law of space raises
three questions related to the NSP06: (1) does customary international law
matter in the first place; (2) if yes, does it exist; and (3) if it exists, does the
NSP06 contradict it?
A. DOES CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTER?
Positive law might not set boundaries for the NSP06, but customary
international law might instead. From one view, customary international law
may, by itself, lack legally binding force and thus would not matter. Despite a
tradition of interpreting international law as "part of our law,"3 US courts have
held that Congress can validly contradict international law through duly enacted
31 See Section II.B (discussing the Outer Space Treaty's vague language).
32 See Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Fronier: The Law of War in Space, 48 Air Force L
Rev 1, 77 (2000) ("Assuming the hostile act were lawfully directed at an asset in conformity with
the jus ad bellum this requirement would not require consultation with the opposing belligerent
State as it would not be engaged in the 'peaceful exploration and use of outer space."').
33 The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900).
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statutes.34 It is nonetheless unclear whether the President can contradict
customary international law through unilateral policy measures such as the
NSP06.35 If international law is "part of our law," then the President must act
consistent with it to fulfill his duties under the Take Care Clause to "faithfully
execute" the laws of the US.36 On the other hand, the President also has
responsibility for maintaining national security.37 The extent of Presidential
power visit-vis customary international law is murkiest when these duties
conflict.
However, even if the President has authority in the US to violate
international law, foreign policy provides good reasons not to do so. First,
international law may itself impose liability on the President's actions. 38 Second,
following customary international law has a series of benefits compared to the
unworkable space treaty system. For example, it might prescribe rules protecting
civilian or military satellites, an area that the space treaties do not cover. It might
also prescribe means of enforcing the space-based rights of countries, including
the US. Moreover, it can evolve to accommodate technological and political
changes because customary international law is derived from practices among
several countries.39 Overall, customary international law potentially fills many of
the gaps that the current treaty system leaves. Third, perceptions that the US is
violating customary international law may themselves have negative foreign
policy consequences. 4°
Domestically, a violation of customary international law might undermine
the President's Take Care duties; internationally, it might undermine
34 See, for example, United States v Yousef, 327 F3d 56, 93 (2d Cir 2003) (noting that where
Congressional intent is clear, statutes are enforceable "irrespective of whether the statute
conforms to customary international law").
35 See Emma V. Broomfield, Note, A Failed Attempt to Circumvent the International Law on Torture: The
Insignificance of Presidential Signing Statements under The Paquete Habana, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 105, 115
(2006) (discussing effect on international law on executive policy statements).
36 US Const, art 2, § 3, cl 4. See Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 Georgetown L J
1213, 1246-50 (2005) (arguing that the President is bound by customary international law).
37 US Const, art 2, § 2.
38 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutogy Construction, 43
Vand L Rev 1103, 1129-31 (1990).
39 The US generally recognizes customary international law as evolutionary, much like Anglo-
American common law. See Yousef 327 F3d at 92-94 (discussing customary international law and
noting that it arises from "customs and practices of [s]tates in the international arena") (cited in
note 34). See generally Sosa v AlvareZ-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (recognizing international law-
based causes of action for circumstances analogous to traditional international law piracy).
40 See Broomfield, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 115 n 66 (cited in note 35) (asking whether "it [is] wise
for the United States to be seen as violating international law among its allies, not to mention
among its enemies').
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international perceptions of the US as obedient to international law. Given that
customary international law matters, the NSP06 should not prevail if it violates
that law.
B. WHAT IS THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SPACE?
Generally, no binding customary international law exists until, over time,
countries' practices have established norms that govern practices between
states.4 Two theories might suggest the availability of a customary international
42law of space: "instant custom" and Earth-based analogies to space.
1. Nearly "Instant Custom" Allowing Preemptive Strikes Generally
Under the theory of "instant custom," customary international law can
form if a state takes unilateral action and other states follow or acquiesce. 43 Rapid
changes in geopolitics require equally rapid development of customary
international law. The instant custom theory accounts for such rapid changes;
although international law formation still requires international acceptance, it can
be formed in a much shorter amount of time, and by fewer countries, than
traditionally required.'
Under the instant custom theory, customary international law arises out of
(1) an articulation of the putative law and (2) an act in support of it or
41 See Ramey, 48 Air Force L Rev at 67-70 (cited in note 32) (noting that "[c]ustomary law is of far
lesser importance and its significance for outer space activities has, in many respects, not been
secured.") (internal citations omitted).
42 It is not clear, however, that customary international law even exists. At first glance, a lack of
space custom undermines the entire concept of a customary international law of space. According
to one estimate in 2000, only six to ten countries had been sufficiently involved in space relations
to consider their actions as contributing to international space law. See id at 70-71. Generally,
without customs, there is no law. And if no customary international law of space exists, then the
NSP06 cannot violate it.
43 See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice In a Divided World, in R. St. J. Macdonald
and Douglas M. Johnston, eds, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy
Doctrine and Theory 513, 532 (Martinus Nijhoff 1983). In The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the
International Court of Justice ("ICj") recognized that customary international law can develop in
a short time from the acts of a few states. See The North Sea ContinentalShelfCases (W Get v Den &
Neth), 1969 ICJ 3, 74 (Feb 28, 1969). See also Benjamin Langille, Note, It's 'nstant Custom":
How the Bush Doctrine Became International Law after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 BC
Intl & Comp L Rev 145, 149-153 (2003) (discussing "instant custom" in context of President
Bush's anti-terrorism policies). But see Ramey, 48 Air Force L Rev at 69 (cited in note 32)
(arguing that the ICJ "implicitly" rejected the instant custom notion); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving
Customary International Law, 27 Mich J Intl L 115, 157-59 (2005) (noting criticisms of instant
custom theory).
44 See Guzman, 27 Mich J Ind L at 157 (cited in note 43) (noting that state practice is still required
to show some form of custom).
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acquiescence demonstrating acceptance of it.4" Generally, an articulation
comprises treaties, conventions of the International Law Commission, or UN
General Assembly resolutions.46 Acts or showings of acquiescence occur over a
short period of time to demonstrate that a norm has developed.
The Bush Doctrine, which asserted the US right to engage in preemptive
strikes, might represent the articulation of custom also allowing the NSP06.47
Under this theory of instant custom, the Bush Doctrine was incorporated into
international law by the announcement of US preemptive strike doctrine and
subsequent acts of other states demonstrating acquiescence to it, including the
international force joining US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.48 If the Bush
Doctrine asserted an instant custom sufficient to establish customary
international law, then the US retains the legitimate right to strike adversaries
preemptively.49 One reading of the NSP06, which excludes space use to those
"hostile to US interests" though not necessarily having harmed the US itself,
embodies this preemptive strike principle of the Bush Doctrine and merely
applies it to space. 0
Scholars have criticized the instant custom theory as incompatible with
customary international law. According to this argument, quick acceptance of a
norm, rather than deliberate actions consistent with the norm taking place over a
long period of time by several states, does not develop custom. 5' However, in
areas of law where technology and politics change rapidly, the traditional
deliberative process is too slow.5 2 Moreover, the ICJ itself noted in one case that
lack of long-established practice does not preclude the making of customary
international law. 3
45 See Langille, 26 BC Ind & Comp L Rev at 151 (cited in note 43).
46 id.
47 Id at 154-56 (arguing that the instant custom theory established the Bush Doctrine as customary
international law).
48 Id.
49 Nonetheless, some scholars have noted international law-based objections to the Bush Doctrine.
See Donna M. Davis, Preemptive War and the Legal Limits of National Secutiy Poliy, 10 Intl Legal
Theory 11, 46-7 (2004).
50 NSP06, Principles (cited in note 1).
51 See, for example, Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terroism as a Legal Concept in
International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 BC Ind & Comp L Rev 23,
65 (2006) (noting, in context of international law governing terrorism, that "[allthough the
potential for 'instant custom' was recognized in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, it requires
extensive and virtually uniform state practice, including that by particularly affected states").
52 See Section II.C.1 for a discussion of how technology and politics render even the space treaties
obsolete.
53 The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 3, 74 (cited in note 43). Note, however, that the
ICJ prefers that states act uniformly when custom arises within a short period of time.
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The instant custom theory suggests that no customary international law of
space would undermine the NSP06. To the extent that the Bush Doctrine
represents a valid implementation of preemption to international law corpus,
customary international law may even embrace the NSP06.
2. Analogies Relating to Exclusion in Space
The instant custom theory is not, however, the sole possible source of a
customary international law of space; applied to space, Earth-based analogies
could fill the role of customary international law. In developing the positive law
foundations of space law, countries looked to analogies to other forms of open
frontier, including Antarctica, airspace, the high seas, and unclaimed lands
generally.5 4 The analogies provided a legal structure for addressing the problems
associated with unclaimed areas. By drawing on the customs developed in the
ostensibly similar contexts of Antarctica, airspace, the high seas, and unclaimed
lands, states had a reasonable structure of established custom for interacting in
the new frontier: space.
Thus, if states acted consistently with one of these analogies in its
spacefaring behavior, then their laws may serve as a good approximation for the
customary international law of space. This section argues that the Antarctica and
airspace analogies fail, but that high seas and unclaimed lands analogies are
plausible.
a) Antarctica analogy. One potential analog to space rights arises from world
treatment of Antarctica. Based on treatment of the world's only uninhabited
continent, the Antarctica analogy would treat space as a nonmilitarized no man's
land. 5 In some ways, the Antarctica analogy works well because the Moon and
Outer Space Treaties support this analogy; the current laws governing outer
space and Antarctica both reserve their respective jurisdictions for "peaceful
purposes" only.56 This makes the Antarctic analogy especially well-suited to
governing the moon. However, the Antarctica analogy fails to apply to
nonmoon space for two primary reasons. First, the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits, in space not consisting of celestial bodies, only weapons of mass
destruction." Second, while the Moon Treaty explicitly bans all military uses, it
54 See Tannenwald, 29 Yale J Intl L at 372 (cited in note 6) (discussing the origins of the space
regime).
55 The Antarctic Treaty (1959), art 1, 1, 12 UST 794 ("Antarctic Treaty"), codified the customary
international law governing use of Antarctica. See also Tannenwald, 29 Yale J Intl L at 374 (cited
in note 6).
56 Antarctic Treaty, art I, 1 (cited in note 55); Moon Treaty, art III, T 1 (cited in note 10); Outer
Space Treaty, art IV, 2 (cited in note 10).
57 Outer Space Treaty, art IV, 1 (cited in note 10).
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does so only on the moon and other celestial bodies.58 Taken together, the
Moon and Outer Space Treaties suggest that while celestial bodies must remain
demilitarized, the space between them generally remains open to military use.
Incongruities between Antarctica and outer space therefore prevent the former's
laws from applying to the latter.
b) Airspace analogy. The airspace analogy would take a less peaceful, more
sovereignty-based view of space. In modern airspace law, states maintain
exclusive control over airspace directly above their territories-they have the
right to attack foreign aircraft in their airspace.5 9 Unlike the Antarctica analogy,
the airspace analogy allows for military strikes for self-defense purposes when a
foreign state threatens to breach a given area. In addition, it implicitly allows
military buildup within a given region in order to deter potential military strikes
from others. The space treaties also allow for limited military buildup by
specifically prohibiting military presence only on celestial bodies.6" The airspace
analogy thus appears better suited than the Antarctica analogy as a basis for a
customary international law of space.
The airspace analogy nonetheless suffers fatal flaws. For example, the
airspace analogy allows strikes against airspace over a given territory. If this were
to apply to space, then anytime an American satellite flew over China or Russia,
those countries would have the right to shoot it down. As recent US anxiety
over China's deployment of its antisatellite system suggests, however, countries
probably would not accept a state shooting down a foreign satellite merely
because it orbits within that state's airspace. Moreover, enforcing the airspace
laws in space is highly impractical. Unlike aircraft within Earth's atmosphere,
satellites and other orbitals generally do not remain over a given country only.
Since the global economy greatly depends on sovereignty-ignoring orbital
satellites, it is unlikely international custom would favor a law that allows
countries to shoot them down.
c) High seas analogy. Traditionally, politicians and legal scholars have
compared space to the high seas.61 The law of the high seas preserves the ocean
as a common resource for all to use. No country can exclude another's use.62 In
space, the law would allow unlimited use of space by any country so long as the
use did not interfere with another's usage rights.
58 Moon Treaty, art III, 4 (cited in note 10).
59 Tannenwald, 29 Yale J Ind L at 373-74 (cited in note 6).
60 See note 58 and accompanying text.
61 Tannenwald, 29 YaleJ Ind L at 374 (cited in note 6).
62 Id.
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Arguably, the Moon and Outer Space Treaties already create a regime
based on the law of the high seas. For example, the Outer Space Treaty provides
that "[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free
for exploration and use by all States ...on a basis of equality., 63 Moreover,
except on celestial bodies, it neither restricts the right of countries to engage in
64military maneuvers and appear to allow the storage of non-nuclear weapons.
The high seas analogy has several benefits. First, by treating space as a
public good, it provides all countries an equal opportunity to use space. Second,
it does not encourage countries to develop space technologies only for military
purposes. In a space legal regime governed under the high seas analogy,
countries would allocate resources to nonmilitary as well military commitments.
Third, states appear to endorse the high seas analogy, at least implicitly.
Countries have developed and launched both commercial and military satellites,
and other countries have not attempted to shoot them down.
Although this view is traditionally accepted, it is not necessarily correct
because countries have not acted to support it to the exclusion of other possible
analogies. Thus, it is not a governing custom. For the most part, only the US and
Russia have explored space to any significant extent. The law of the high seas
requires that all countries have equal access to the medium at hand. But if
another ten countries suddenly possessed technology to explore space to the
extent of the US or Russia, it is not clear that the countries acquiring space
technology would permit equal access. Overall, however, the high seas analogy
remains plausible.
d) Unclaimed land analogy, or the law of terra nullius. Under the doctrine of terra
nullius, countries compete for sovereignty over certain lands. Countries can claim
and protect territory based on the occupation of a given territory.65 In The Island
of Palmas Case, the US and the Netherlands maintained competing claims to a
previously unclaimed island off the Philippine coast.66 The US based its claim on
preexisting occupation of the Philippines; the Netherlands grounded its
argument in the fact that it exercised authority and policed the island. Ultimately,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration held that the Netherlands held title to the
island because of its "peaceful and continuous" display of authority over the
island.67 The ICJ reaffirmed the claim and occupation principle in The Minquiers
63 Outer Space Treaty, art I, 2 (cited in note 10).
64 See generally id.
65 See William B. Heflin, Recent Developments: DiayoulSenkaku Islands Dipute: Japan and China, Oceans
Apart, 1 Asian-Pac L & PolyJ 1, 16-18 (2000) (discussing law of unclaimed land).
66 Id at 9-11. See The Island of Palmas Case (US v Neth), 2 RIAA 829 (Perm Ct Arb 1928).
67 The Island ofPalmas, 2 RAA at 845-46 (cited in note 66). See Heflin, 1 Asian-Pac L & Poly J at 11
(cited in note 65).
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and Ecrehos Case,65 in which the Court affirmed UK possession over an island
group after the UK established forms of governance over the islands. 69 The law
of unclaimed territory thus takes the law of the high seas a step further. Instead
of reserving space for all of mankind, it allows countries to take possession of it
and to exclude it from the use of others.
Terra nullius law has a number of advantages. First, it would reward
countries with technological superiority and encourage those lagging behind to
further develop their own technology. On Earth, if countries wanted pieces of
unclaimed territory, they had to develop their economies to compete against
others. Space-based terra nullius law might encourage more countries to improve
their technologies in order to challenge Chinese, Russian, and US dominance in
space.
Second, terra nullius law would avoid the enforcement problems that
threaten the current space regime. In seeking unclaimed territory, the prevailing
law depended not on coordination but economic prowess. In The Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case, the UK won possession of an otherwise unclaimed island because
of its ability to monitor the area with customs houses and census data
collection. 0 International law rewards the ability to enforce unclaimed territories
with sovereignty, a function of its economic strength. By implication, weaker
countries cannot govern the area effectively and thus lack claims. In space,
instead of countries equivocating about their rights in space or depending on
vague treaty enforcement provisions, the more powerful countries would define
the laws of space.
Third, the law of terra nullius would deal well with the problems of
technology and politics that trouble the current space law regime. In contrast to
the airspace analogy and obsolete Moon and Outer Space Treaties, new
technological developments do not decrease the applicability of terra nullius law.
Actually, new technology helps it-the more advanced a country's technology is
over its competitors', the better that country can defend its new territory. Unlike
the modern space treaty regime, moreover, political conflicts do not endanger
the law's usefulness. Instead, they encourage countries to assert their rights to
the otherwise unclaimed territories. Countries rush to claim unused lands for
their own benefit.
68 (UK v FR), 1953 ICJ 47, 57 (Nov 17, 1953) ("What is of decisive importance ... [is] evidence
which relates directly to the possession of the land in question."). See Heflin, 1 Asian-Pac L &
PolyJ at 14 (cited in note 65).
69 For example, the UK built custom houses and collected census data from island inhabitants. See
Heflin, 1 Asian-Pac L & PolyJ at 14 (cited in note 65).
70 See id (discussing the UK's means of staking claim to islands).
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The three virtues of terra nullius law-encouragement of innovation,
establishment of enforcement mechanisms, and adaptability to changing
circumstances-render it a potentially ideal law for the extraterrestrial frontier.7'
C. IS THE NSP06 CONSISTENT WITH CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Whether the NSP06 is valid depends on where it stands in light of the
three viable customary international law schemes. Under the instant custom and
terra nullius schemes, the NSP06 appears valid, but under the law of the high seas
scheme, it does not.
1. Validity under the "Instant Custom" of the Bush Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine establishes the US international law right to strike its
adversaries preemptively. 72 The NSP06 provision in question-the US reserves
the right to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to
[US] interests" 3-merely rearticulates the preemption principle and applies it to
space. Both conditions of the instant custom theory of international law,
therefore, have been satisfied: the Bush Doctrine articulates the justifying policy,
and the NSP06 acts on that articulation. The Bush Doctrine thus appears to
validate the NSP06 in the eyes of customary international law.
2. Validity under the Plausible Analogies to Space
a) Terra nullius doctrine applied to qpace. While the Bush Doctrine validates the
NSP06's preemption aspects, the terra nullius doctrine as applied to space
validates the NSP06's claim that the US can exclude other countries from space
use.7 4 In unclaimed land cases, once a state stakes a claim and occupies a given
territory, that state acquires title, which implies the right to exclude other states
from using the territory.75
Arguably, the US already occupies space for terra nullius purposes. It has
long been one of space's primary occupants. The US conducts various tasks of
71 But see Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating
Nineteenth Century First Possession Ptinciples into the 1967 Outer Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer
Space for the Tweno-First Century, 35 Seton Hall L Rev 299, 306 (2004) (claiming that the Outer
Space Treaty forbids national appropriation).
72 See Section III.B.1.
73 NSP06, Principles (cited in note 1).
74 See id (reserving right to deny use of space to adversaries).
75 See note 68 and accompanying text.
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space exploration 6 and it maintains a key role in maintenance of the
international space station. 7 Consequently, the US may already have established
itself as dominating space enough to assert rights to exclude space from other
states' use. On the other hand, some countries have started nascent space
programs,78 and China's increasing accumulation of space power might threaten
whatever dominance in space the US currently holds.
However, because the ICJ requires acts evincing governance of unclaimed
territory to support a claim, two reasons suggest that the US might have valid
rights to exclude other countries under customary international law.79 First, the
US's current space involvement, including its international space station and
other space exploration tasks, serve analogous ends of the customs house and
census collection data of the The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case.8" Like the customs
house and census collection, current US space involvement includes exploration
and data collection. In addition, the significant monetary expenditure required
for governance suggests that, like the UK in the unclaimed island case, the US
presumably has the resources to use and defend the unclaimed space
efficiently.8' Second, the NSP06 itself may be the assertion of possession that the
ICJ requires. If the US allocates resources to place weapons in space, then it
would be acting in accordance with claims to exclude adversaries from the use of
space, under the The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case paradigm.82 In both cases,
customary international law of unclaimed territory suggests that the NSP06's
exclusion provision is valid.
b) Invalidity under the law of the high seas applied to space. Nonetheless, if the law
of the high seas were to apply, then Bush's NSP06 appears to contradict
customary international law. If, as the NSP06 provides, the US retains power to
"deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to [JS]
interests," then it violates the essential premise that no country can exclude
76 See, for example, NASA, Missions, available online at <http://www.nasa.gov/missions/
highlights/index.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (summarizing latest examples of US involvement
in space).
77 See NASA, Space Station: Resupplying the Station, available online at <http://www.nasa.gov/
mission-pages/station/resupply/index.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (listing times the US
resupplied and maintained the International Space Station over the last two years).
78 See Ty S. Twibell, Space Law: Legal Constraints on Commercialization and Development of Outer Space, 65
UMKC L Rev 589, 599 (1997).
79 See The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 ICJ at 57 (cited in note 68).
80 Id.
81 See Section III.B.2.d for a discussion of efficiency considerations behind terra nul#us doctrine.
82 In addition, placement of weapons may also satisfy the "instant custom" theory that validates the
Bush Doctrine.
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space from any other's use." On the high seas, any party can engage in
nonoffensive military practice hostile to another country's interest without fear
of retribution. Iran could shoot cruise missiles at dummy US warships, but the
law of the high seas forbids the US from retaliating against Iran. Alternatively, if
the US were to "deny" the ocean to Iran because that country made use of it
"hostile to [US] interests," then such a denial would be illegal under international
law, potentially as a blockade-an act of war.84 Similarly, if the US were to deny
China use of its space satellites as target practice, then the US action would
become an act of war.
As noted, however, the law of the high seas works because a credible
enforcement mechanism is in place to stop violations.8" No such mechanism
exists in space.
IV. CONCLUSION: IS THE NSP06 DESIRABLE?
The NSP06 is no doubt unpopular internationally, but it is not clearly
illegal. The NSP06 does not contradict established international law. First, the
space treaties' pervasive ambiguities fail to clearly prohibit the actions proposed
by the NSP06. Meanwhile, the treaties' growing obsolescence brings their
viability into question. Second, customary international law does not prohibit the
NSP06, either. The instant customary international law represented by the Bush
Doctrine actually contemplates, not prohibits, the space-based military
preemption that the NSP06 embodies. The long-settled customary international
law of terra nullius, as applied to space, also does not prohibit the NSP06's
provisions.
International law would contradict the NSP06 only if the law of space were
based on the law of the high seas. However, the high seas analogy probably
should not apply for the same reason that technology and politics render the
space treaties obsolete: its lack of viable mechanism for keeping order in space.
Without such a mechanism or the prevailing law, the law might as well not exist.
However, although distasteful because it allows militarily dominant countries to
control the medium-whether space or sea-at issue, the Bush Doctrine and
the law of terra nullius fill the enforcement gap.
Nonetheless, better enforcement does not mean a better regime. Chinese
and Russian reactions to the NSP06 indicate that the policy may be sacrificing
peace for enforcement. Though the NSP06 may be legal, it may also incite
83 NSP06, Principles 5 (cited in note 1).
84 See Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 Chi J Intl L 1, 6
(2006) ("[A] blockade ... is a use of force that usually amounts to an act of war.").
85 See Section III.B.2.c.
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extraterrestrial violence in stark contrast to the half-century of peace that has
ensued in space. Perhaps the strength of an international space regime rests not
in the clarity and enforceability that the NSP06 favors, but in the vague notions
of international spirit of cooperation that the space treaties imply but do not
explicitly require.
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